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University of Oklahoma, $34.95 ISBN 9780806153834
A Timeless Disaster Carefully Revisted
In this first book length treatment of the March 1876 Powder River fight
since J.W. Vaughn's The Reynolds Campaign on Powder River (1961), retired
National Park Superintendent Paul Hedren builds on his earlier treatment of the
Sioux War's causes and effects, most notably in Ho! For the Black Hills:
Captain Jack Crawford Reports the Black Hills Gold Rush and the Great Sioux
War (2012) and After Custer: Loss and Transformation in Sioux Country (2011).
His contribution is a judicious use of sources not available to Vaughn, including
a detailed after action report by army surgeon Curtis Munn, various Sioux and
Northern Cheyenne accounts unknown to Vaughn in pre-internet times, and a
file of Adjutant General's Office administrative records relating to the three
consequent courts martial. But while Powder River sheds light on the Sioux
War's first and least appreciated chapter, it does so without refuting the generally
accepted view: For the United States, this particular battle was an unexpectedly
bad start to an inevitable confrontation.
Thanks to Vaughn, the general outlines have been well enough known, and
Hedren avoids re-telling what has already been told well enough: Acting on the
orders of Philip Sheridan, commanding general of the Military Department of the
Missouri, George Crook, commanding the Military Department of the Platte,
ordered elements of the Second and Third Cavalry Regiments to force
recalcitrant Sioux and Northern Cheyenne bands onto reservations where Red
Cloud and others had already relocated. Launching a winter campaign under
harsh conditions, Crook led ten companies north from Fort Fetterman on 1
March in search of non-treaty Sioux, believed to be encamped somewhere on the
Powder River, location unknown. After only twenty-nine miles, Indians drove
off the accompanying cattle herd, putting the entire expedition on short rations.
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Two weeks later as those rations were running low, Crook's scouts located Old
Bear's Northern Cheyenne band in a village on the Powder River (mistakenly
identified at the time as Crazy Horse's village). Keeping 300 troops and the field
trains with himself, Crook directed Colonel Joseph Reynolds of the Third
Cavalry to take the remainder, destroy the village, confiscate supplies, and
capture as many ponies as possible. Reynolds' background bore significantly on
his appointment by Crook, not so much because this was the same Reynolds who
had commanded one of Thomas's divisions during Longstreet's breakthrough at
Chickamauga, but because Ranald McKenzie of the Fourth Cavalry had more
recently accused him of fraud in the handling of government contracts. Drawing
on Bourke's On the Border with Crook (1891), Hedren maintains the
conventionally accepted view that Crook's choice of Reynolds was intended to
repair the latter's reputation and that Reynolds, despite his fifty-three years and
an inguinal hernia that made him unfit for the campaign, embraced the
opportunity.
The result on St. Patrick's Day morning 1876 was a poorly coordinated
assault that allowed all but four hostiles to escape. The village finally secured,
Colonel Reynolds then ordered his own starving and frostbitten troopers to
destroy the massive quantities of meat and buffalo robes they so desperately
needed, against Crook's orders. They also captured 700 war ponies, but Reynolds
failed to secure the herd and all but fifty were back in Indian hands after two
days. Worst of all, Reynolds ordered several dead and one wounded soldier left
behind.
Postponed until the conclusion of the 1876 campaigns and thus conducted
after Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn, the trials of Reynolds and two of his
battalion commanders drew mixed reactions from their contemporaries: surprise
that the accused’s connections in Washington did not save them, but satisfaction
that a general court martial had addressed some glaring examples of failed
leadership. While allowing that the verdicts may have been tainted by persons
more interested in restoring the Army's damaged reputation than justice for the
defendants, Hedren scrupulously avoids guessing as to the degree. He is more
definite in his assertions that one of the trials, that of Captain Henry Noyes (3rd
Battalion) was unnecessary and, more notably, that prejudicial pretrial publicity
attended the Reynolds case. Accounts leaked to the New York Tribune by the
expedition's paymaster brought the paymaster a reprimand even though the court
found Reynolds guilty of three charges. Hedren also allows that the release of
Frederick Whittaker's hagiographical A Complete Life of Gen. George A. Custer
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several months earlier, and a review of it in the December 1876 Army and Navy
Journal that blamed Custer's subordinates, may have influenced officers at the
Reynolds court martial.
Fortunately, detailed coverage of the trials does not obscure the Powder
River action's more far-reaching effects. By emboldening the Sioux and
involving the Northern Cheyenne, it not only led to the Seventh Cavalry's
destruction in June, but exhausted elements of the Second and Third, whose
troopers then deserted at unprecedented rates because of Reynolds' proven
disregard for their welfare. That said, the trials and subsequent recriminations are
this campaign's distinctive feature and occupy a full third of the text. And while
one might consider prejudicial a reference on p. xiii to Reynolds' "constant
bickering ever after, " the author supports any negative assessments of Reynolds
and his subordinates thoroughly. He rehabilitates no one and demonstrates that
Reynolds indeed lost control of the operation, lied about ordering a wounded
man left behind, and took not the least precaution to secure the captured ponies.
That he treats such inexcusable mistakes without making the fog of war seem
any less real is perhaps the book's greatest strength. Rule number one, then and
now, is that things will go wrong in combat no matter who is in charge.
Readers might also notice that Reynolds' biggest tactical mistake -- trusting
his least reliable battalion commander with the greatest degree of independence
-- violated no article of war. Captain Alexander Moore, the other battalion
commander to be court martialed, had served with Crook in a recent campaign
against the Apaches, during which Crook had suspected him of cowardice and
then oddly refrained from pressing charges. Hedren's account of the Powder
River action five years later hints that perhaps he should have; that Moore's
appointment to battalion command, like Crook's appointment of Reynolds, had
been an unwarranted favor given not because of, but despite a reputation. On 17
March 1876, Moore's 5th Battalion was to close a likely escape route at the far
end of Old Bear's village, but was at least 800 yards out of position when the
action commenced. Having failed to spring the trap, Moore then ordered his
troops to open fire on the village from too great a range, endangering friendly
forces without inflicting any casualties on the enemy. Like Reynolds and Noyes,
he received a light sentence, but a permanent stain on his record.
Because of the Powder River disaster's timing and Commanding General
William T. Sherman's aversion to negative publicity, Crook never faced a court
martial of his own, and therein lies this story's loosest loose end. Self-serving
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though it was, Reynolds's fifty-six page statement to the court raises legitimate
questions -- the same questions that will likely have crossed the reader's mind
well before Hedren raises them. Why did Crook keep two fifths of his combat
strength with him instead of committing more to the assault? Why did Crook
keep the trains with himself if the capture of provisions was so important? And,
having decided to split his command, why did Crook keep his four companies far
enough from Reynolds that mutual support was impossible? All of this Crook
ordered, even though he knew that Reynolds was new to Indian fighting. That
Crook was apparently betting the lives of his men so that Reynolds and Moore
could restore their reputations seems neither professional nor well timed. In the
end, however, Reynolds' flawed conduct of the battle not only made him more
expendable to his contemporaries, but has disqualified him as a witness to his
superior's mistakes ever since.
Hedren includes enough of Sherman's endorsement and Crook's testimony to
frame this unsolved problem. While confirming Reynolds' conviction and
eschewing any proceedings against Crook, Sherman nevertheless noted that
Crook should not have divided his command. Nor does Crook's own testimony,
quoted on p. 291, make him look any less culpable: "[I]f I had not preferred
charges against [Reynolds], "said Crook, "I would be held responsible and I did
not propose to take the responsibility. " As a military professional, General
Crook must have known that he could only delegate authority -- not
responsibility -- and that he was ultimately responsible for anything that those
under his command, including Reynolds, did or failed to do.
As the expedition's ranking officer, Crook was also responsible for its
logistics, which would have been problematic even if Reynolds' command had
taken some food and robes from Old Bear's village. As Reynolds noted, Crook
had kept the field trains with himself on the day of the battle. The early loss of
the beef supply and consequent short rations also would have kept the
campaign's logistical tether near the breaking point regardless of what happened
once the shooting started. A properly supported campaign in Wyoming and
Montana Territories required a supply point considerably closer to the action
than that which Crook used, but impatience in Washington would have made
sufficient preparation impossible in any case. Indeed, it is the false assumptions
and missteps of superiors -- all noted by the author -- that allow the reader to
place Reynolds' failures in their proper perspective. If, as noted on p. 343,
Reynolds "weaseled" when lying under oath, Crook's equally disingenuous
escape from what should have been an equally tight spot deserves an equally
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loaded verb.
A former armor officer, John Daley teaches the military history courses at
Pittsburg State University in southeastern Kansas.
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